)>IJH=?J By now it is widely recognized that the more serious threats of climate change are associated with abrupt events capable of inicting losses on a catastrophic scale. Consequently, the main role of climate policies is to balance between mitigation eorts, aimed at delaying (or even preventing) the occurrence of such events, and adaptation actions, aimed at minimizing the damage inicted upon occurrence. The former affects the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere; the latter determines the impact of loss once the event occurs. This work examines the tradeos associated with these two types of policy measures by characterizing the optimal mitigation-adaptation mix in the long run.
Introduction
It is widely recognized by now that the more serious threats of climate change are associated with abrupt changes capable of inicting losses on a catastrophic scale (Alley et al. 2003 , Field et al. 2012 . Each link in the chain leading from anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) to the abrupt change in climate and the ensuing damage involves uncertain elements (Schelling 2007 , Tol 2012 . An appropriate framework to analyze such situations involves discrete events triggered by conditions that are either imperfectly understood (e.g., include unknown parameters) or involve genuine stochastic elements. Any climate change-induced event can be categorized as one or a combination of these two types. Tsur and Zemel (1996) , for example, studied the rst type of climate events those triggered when a certain threshold is crossed (i.e., tipping point events).
While the threshold itself does not change (hence crossing it is a deterministic event), its location depends on parameters that are unknown or only partially known to modelers and policymakers. In contrast, the events analyzed in Tsur and Zemel (1998) or Gjerde et al. (1999) are triggered by genuinely stochastic conditions. It turns out that the method of analysis as well as the ensuing optimal policies dier between these two types of events (see discussion in Tsur and Zemel 2007) . Here we consider the latter type of climate events those triggered by stochastic conditions. Policy measures for dealing with threats of abrupt climate change can be categorized into two types. The rst includes measures aimed at delaying or even preventing the event occurrence by reducing emission of GHG or by capturing (sequestering) carbon and storing it at harmless locations. Such measures are commonly referred to as mitigation policies. Measures of the second type are aimed at reducing, or even eliminating, the damage caused by the event once it occurs, e.g., building levees to prevent ooding, developing a cure or a vaccine for diseases that are likely to spread due to the arrival of certain pathogens, or developing crop varieties that can better sustain a range of climate conditions. These measures are commonly referred to as adaptation policies. A comprehensive climate policy contains measures of both types and characterizing the optimal policy requires evaluating the tradeos between them (Tol 2005 , Bréchet et al. 2013 . In this work we present a framework for accomplishing this goal, focusing on the long run.
To that end, we use the mitigation-adaptation framework oered by Zemel (2015) , which combines mitigation policies aecting the random occurrence date of a detrimental event (such as in Tsur and Zemel 1998) with adaptation policies aecting the damage inicted upon occurrence (such as in Tsur and Withagen 2013) . By assuming that the costs and eects of adaptation investments are linear, Zemel (2015) was able to characterize the entire time prole of the optimal mitigation-adaptation policy.
In this work we relax this linearity assumption and focus on characterizing the optimal steady state, i.e., the optimal adaptation-mitigation policy in the long run. We do this by extending the method of Tsur and Zemel (2014c) for characterizing optimal steady states of multi-state dynamic systems to situations involving random events. In the present context the model contains two state variables: an atmospheric GHG stock, aecting the occurrence probability of a detrimental event and determined by the mitigation policy; and an adaptation capital stock whose role is to reduce the damage inicted upon occurrence.
We provide necessary conditions for the location and stability of optimal steady states. These conditions give rise to a simple method for characterizing the optimal mitigation-adaption mix in the long run. A caveat regarding the relation of these results to the realities of the climate change problem is in order here. The literature presents a long list of potential climate-related catastrophes of very diverse nature. The threats dier in the dependence of the hazard rates (or frequency of occurrence) on the GHG stock, the events may be recurrent or give rise to a single irreversible shock, the damage may destroy capital or aect consumption directly, induce loss of life or give rise to other forms of decreased welfare. Obviously, a two-state analytic model cannot pretend to describe the details of all such possibilities, nor is it the purpose of the present paper to provide such a description. This goal may be better addressed by running any of the complex numerical Integrated Assessment Models. Here, we employ a specic (though non-trivial) formulation to illustrate how the method works in a particular setting. Indeed, many of the assumptions can be altered to t other catastrophic models of choice. The characterization of the optimal climate policy will correspondingly change, but the method suggested here is general enough to study these variants in a simple and unied manner.
Setup
An abrupt climate-change induced event, capable of inicting a severe damage, may occur at some uncertain future date T . The distribution of T is governed by a hazard rate function h(Q) that depends on the atmospheric GHG stock Q. The event inicts a damage ψ(k) that depends on the adaptation capital k available at T . The climate policy consists of mitigation eorts to curb the accumulation of GHG and of investment in adaptation capital. The policymaker task is to set the optimal mix of these two activities over time.
The model described below addresses this problem.
Climate policy
Production activities at time t generate emissions at the rate m(t) that accumulate to form the GHG stock Q(t) according tȯ
where γ is the natural GHG removal rate. Emission is bounded above by a nite maximal ratem and mitigation at time t is measured as the dierencē m − m(t) between the maximal and actual rates. The upper bound on m implies the maximal feasible GHG stockQ =m/γ. Given that no event has occurred by time t 0 , the GHG stock process Q(·) aects the distribution of the random occurrence date T of the event through the hazard rate function
for t ≥ t 0 ≥ 0. The corresponding conditional distribution and density functions of T are, respectively,
Occurrence at time T inicts the damage ψ(k(T )), where ψ(·) decreases in the adaptation capital k at a diminishing rate:
The adaptation capital accumulates according tȯ
where a(·) is the investment in adaptation capital and δ is a depreciation rate.
The production activities associated with emission give rise to the instantaneous utility u(m, a) which increases with the emission rate m and decreases with adaptation investment rate a (since the latter comes at the expense of consumption). More specically, we assume
A climate policy consists of the action processes {m(t), a(t), t ≥ 0}. A policy is feasible if m(t) ∈ [0,m] and a(t)
≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Payo
We consider recurrent events, i.e., events that may occur again and again, where the distribution of the next occurrence date is determined by the hazard process h(Q(t)), as dened in (2.2), when t 0 is the previous occurrence date or zero if no event has yet occurred. Each time the event occurs it inicts the penalty ψ(k) corresponding to the adaptation capital k at the occurrence date. Apart from inicting the penalty, occurrence does not change the ow of Subscripts denote partial derivatives. In typical applications, the contributions of m and a to the utility are independent, u am = 0 and the last condition is trivially satised. The assumption on u aa represents the point of departure from the model of Zemel (2015) , since it rules out a linear dependence on the control variable a.
See Tsur and Zemel (1998) for a distinction between single occurrence and recurrent events. In the present formulation, increased GHG concentration implies higher frequency of occurrence, while for some climate events (e.g., hurricanes) the threat is of increased intensity. Note, however, that we deal here with environmental catastrophes, i.e., rare events of exceptional intensity and impact. Varying the event intensity also aects the frequency of extremely intense occurrences. utility or the dynamics of the stock variables, nor the probability distribution of yet another occurrence. We stress again that this damage specication is just one possibility out of a rich menu of possible environmental damages, such as capital destruction or reduced utility. It is adopted here because it allows a clear distinction between the roles of mitigation and adaptation in this model.
Let v(Q, k) denote the value function (i.e., the value of the objective obtained with the optimal policy when the initial stocks are Q and k). Assuming, without loss of generality, that t 0 = 0 and the rst event occurs at T , the payo
Taking expectation with respect to the distribution T , using (2.2)-(2.3), gives
is the continuation value at the time of occurrence. The optimal policy is the feasible process {m(t), a(t), t ≥ 0} that maximizes (2.6) subject to (2.1) and (2.4), given
evaluating the objective (2.6) at the optimal policy. Note that (2.6) contains
is only implicitly dened. For long run analysis aimed at characterizing the steady states, the implicit denition poses no diculty, as shown below.
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Let X = (Q, k) ′ and C = (m, a) ′ denote, respectively, the state and action vectors (a prime over a vector or a matrix indicates the transpose operator).
For any state X, letĈ(X) denote the adaptation-mitigation actions that maintain the state xed at X indenitely. Noting (2.1) and (2.4),
Let W (X) denote the expected payo obtained when the (not necessarily optimal) steady state policyĈ(X) is maintained indenitely (before and after occurrences). Under this policy, the state process remains xed at X and the T distribution (2.3) reduces to exponential (with the parameter h(Q)).
Evaluating (2.6) under the steady state policy gives
Since the steady state policy proceeds also after occurrence, the continuation value φ(X) reduces to W (X) − ψ(k) and (3.2) becomes
Solving for W (X), we nd
The rst term u(γQ, δk)/ρ is the steady state value without catastrophic risk.
The second term describes the expected cumulative loss from a Poisson series of events when the penalty ψ associated with each event is weighted at the discount factor corresponding to its time of occurrence.
Let f (X, C) ≡ u(m, a) + h(Q)φ(X) be the instantaneous utility associated
with the expected payo (2.6). The gradient vector of f with respect to C, evaluated at (X,Ĉ(X)) is given by
The state-dynamics equations (2.1) and (2.4) can be jointly expressed aṡ
Let J G X and J G C denote the Jacobian matrices with respect to X and C, respectively. Then,
Next, following Tsur and Zemel (2014c) we introduce the function
where
is the gradient vector of W (X). In the present setting, noting (3.4) and (3.5),
We shall show below that the function L(·) represents the tradeos associated with internal steady states, in the sense that its terms cancel each other when evaluated at such states. Formally:
! J G C is given in (3.5) as the identity matrix, hence including its inverse in the denition of L appears redundant. We keep it here for consistency with the general theory (see Appendix) and to allow extensions with more complicated state-dynamics equations. Property 1. Assume the state bounds 0 ≤ Q ≤Q and 0 ≤ k ≤k. The following conditions hold at an optimal steady stateX = (Q,k)
Property 2. If a steady stateX at which L(X) = 0 is locally stable,
With some modications to account for the presence of a Q-dependent hazard, the proofs of the properties proceed along the steps of the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 in Tsur and Zemel (2014c) . The proof of Property 1 is outlined in the appendix; the proof of Property 2 is omitted.
For the model at hand, Property 1 implies, noting (3.7), that at an internal steady state (where L(X) = 0) the following conditions hold:
The rst condition denes the optimal steady state for the Q process when the adaptation capital is constrained atk. It relates the increase in utility ow when the emission rate is increased by the marginal amount dm = γdQ to the increase in the expected damage ow corresponding to shifting the pollution stock by dQ and evaluating at the eective discount rate ρ + γ associated with the Q dynamics. The second condition denes the optimal steady state for the k process when the GHG stock is constrained to be xed atQ. It relates the decrease in utility ow when the investment rate is increased by the marginal amount da = δdk to the decrease in the expected damage ow corresponding "X is locally stable if there exists some ϵ > 0 such that (along the optimal trajectory) ∥X(t 0 ) −X∥ < ϵ at some t 0 implies X(t) →X.
to shifting the adaptation capital by dk and evaluating at the eective discount rate ρ + δ associated with the k dynamics. When both stocks are free to vary, an optimal steady state requires both conditions to hold, demonstrating the way in which the L function captures the tradeos associated with the steady state for each of the stock variables.
Evaluating the Jacobian of L at the internal steady state, we nd
) . 
Example
We follow Zemel's (2015) example, modifying the adaptation policy to allow for nonlinear eects. 
and 
we nd
The function Q 1 (·) is increasing. The higher is the adaptation capital k, the lower is the inicted damage hence the planner can increase the GHG stock and the associated hazard. This observation reects an important adaptationmitigation tradeo: a higher adaptation capital provides a higher insurance coverage against the perils of a climate change catastrophe, hence reduces the incentive to exert mitigation eorts in order to avoid or delay occurrence.
The function Q 2 (·) is also increasing. The larger is the GHG stock, the higher the risk and the incentive to invest in increasing k. The condition that L(·) must vanish at an internal steady state clearly displays the tradeos between the two responses to the hovering risk. Indeed, imposing this condition entails Q 1 (k) = Q 2 (k) which reduces to a polynomial equation in k. Using the values in Table 1 , we nd that the conditions l 1 = l 2 = 0 reduce in this example to and
It is seen that the upper curve is negative and the lower curve is positive for all k ∈ [0,k], ruling out, by virtue of Property 1, the possibility that a steady state falls on one of the Q boundaries. This means that the occurrence hazard is insucient to drive the GHG stock (and the corresponding emission rate) all the way down to zero, but on the other hand, it does not allow this stock to reach the maximal levelQ that would have been obtained if the emission rate m were chosen so as to maximize the utility u at all times. for Q < 166.67). Thus, if a steady state withk =k is optimal, it must havê Q ≥ 166.67. However, Figure 5 shows that l 1 (Q,k) < 0 in this Q range, hence Property 1 implies that such a steady state cannot be optimal.
The above considerations leave (Q,k) = (0, 0) as the unique optimal steady Figure 5 : l 1 (Q,k) vs. the GHG stock Q under high hazard sensitivity β = 0.01.
The negative values of l 1 (Q,k) at the higher Q states rule out (by virtue of Property 1-(ii)) a steady state withk =k andQ in this range.
state in the case of β = 0.01. The result can be attributed to the high hazard sensitivity. The strong dependence of the hazard rate on the GHG stock provides a strong incentive to reduce emissions and bring the occurrence probability down to zero. However, eliminating the risk also removes the motivation to invest in adaptation, hence the adaptation capital stock k is also driven down to its lowest feasible level. The tradeos between mitigation and adaptation measures are evident in this case.
Concluding comments
We study long-term adaptation-mitigation tradeos in situations involving risk of catastrophic climate events, where the mitigation policy inuences the event occurrence probability and the adaptation policy aects the severity of damage upon occurrence. The analysis extends Zemel (2015) to nonlinear policies and is based on the multi state L−method of Tsur and Zemel (2014c) , appropriately modied to allow for uncertain discrete events. We nd that the method can identify a unique candidate for the optimal two-dimensional steady state, both when this state is interior, determined by the adaptation/mitigation tradeos, as well as when it is a corner state depending on some feasibility constraint. In both cases, the eventual steady state reects the strong interaction between the adaptation and mitigation responses to the catastrophic risk.
Although the model is presented in the context of a climate change problem, the framework can be used, with obvious modications, in other multidimensional resource situations involving uncertain discrete events, such as an abrupt regime shift in the dynamics of exploited ecosystems and other regenerating resources (see examples in Dasgupta and Mäler 2003 , Tsur and Zemel 2007 , Polasky et al. 2011 , de Zeeuw and Zemel 2012 .
of this policy. If the variation policy yields a payo that exceeds W (X), then the steady-state policy is not optimal at X and this state does not qualify as an optimal steady state. For small ε > 0 and ∆ = (δ 1 , δ 2 ) ′ , the variation policy is dened by
While t < ε, C ε∆ (t) deviates slightly from the steady-state policyĈ(X), then it enters a steady state at X(ε). During the rst period when t < ε, Summing the contributions of the two periods gives the payo V ε∆ (X) obtained under the variation policy:
Thus, noting (3.6),
The signs of the elements of ∆ can be freely chosen, while ε > 0. 
